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RATIONING JUSTICE-THE SUPREME
COURT'S CASELOAD AND WHAT
THE COURT DOES NOT DO*
Erwin N. Griswoldt
"Thou shalt not ration justice" thundered Learned Hand,1 as
only he could thunder. Like all sweeping generalizations, this
statement is doubtless too sweeping. But there are few who would
question the essence of Judge Hand's directive. Within wide limits,
we should not ration justice. But that is exactly what we have been
doing, for many years, with worsening results, at the highest level,
in our arrangements for the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States.'
I
THE PROBLEM REVIEWED

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been a perennial
topic for discussion and for action in our governmental history. On
at least two occasions, the problems caused by the Court's heavy
caseload have become so serious that Congress has -made radical
changes in the assignment of the Court.3 The first of these changes
* This Article was delivered as part of the fifty-seventh Frank Irvine lecture series at
the Cornell Law School on October 30, 1974.
t Attorney, District of Columbia. Dean, Harvard Law School, 1946-1968; Solicitor
General of the United States,, 1968-1973.
' Address by Learned Hand before the Legal Aid Society of New York, Feb. 16, 1951
(9 NLADA BRIEFCASE 5 (1951)). I am indebted to Professor Yale Kamisar for help in
locating the source of this quotation.
2 Judge Hand's admonition was delivered in a context of making counsel available
through Legal Aid. But counsel are not of much use in a case which a court is unable to hear
because refusing to hear is the device used for keeping the court's docket within the limits of
its time and capacity. Rationing is rationing, wherever it occurs.
' See Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A.J. 361 (1973).
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was in 1891 when the Circuit Courts of Appeals were established.4
The second change was in 1925 when much of the Court's jurisdiction was placed on a discretionary basis by the "Judge's Bill."5 That
change was made at the instance of the Justices of the Court, and
no one questions today that it was necessary and for a considerable
period of time successful.
Nearly fifty years have passed since the Judge's Bill was
enacted, and the pressures are intense again. As a result, there
have been extensive studies and discussions of the problem over
the past several years. The most important of these was The Report
of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court,6 prepared by a
committee appointed by the Chief Justice, as Chairman of the
Federal Judicial Center, with Professor Paul A. Freund as chairman. This Report, often known as the Freund Report, focused
attention on the problem, and provided a base for further discussion and consideration. That discussion has been extensive. Much
thought and effort have been contributed to the problem, and
some emotions have been aroused.
I will not undertake here to review all of the discussions that
have appeared in print, nor the various proposals that have been
made, first by the Freund Committee itself, and later by others
who sought to meet some of the objections which were raised
against proposals made in the Freund Report. That would be
tedious. It would not help those who have followed the problem in
detail, nor would it be useful to those who have only a general
interest in the questions. My purpose in this lecture is to try to
4 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
5 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
6 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT].
7 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT-AND WHAT, IF ANY-

THING, To Do ABOUT IT (Domestic Affairs Study 21, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research (Nov. 1973)); Alsup, A Policy Assessment, of The National Court of

Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); Black, The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise
Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40
U. Cm. L. REv. 473 (1973); Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 339 (1974); Freund, Why We Need The National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J.
247 (1973); Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1301 (1974); Friendly,
Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1974); Gressman, The
National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Haynsworth, A New Court to
Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973); Hufstedler, Courtship and Other
Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545 (1974); Kurland, Jurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court:
Timefor a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 616 (1974); Poe, Schmidt & Whalen,A National Court
of Appeals: A Dissenting View, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 842 (1973); Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60
A.B.A.J. 787 (1974); Warren, Let's Not Weaken the Supreme Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 677 (1974). See
also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); Griswold, The Supreme
Court's Case Load: Civil Rights and Other Problems, 1973 U. ILL. L. FORUM 615.
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change the focus of the discussion somewhat, and to advance a
proposal which differs in important ways from those which have
been made before.
Out of the discussions so far, certain rules for progress can, I
think, be distilled. In setting these out, I draw heavily on a similar
list which Judge Hufstedler advanced in her address before the
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation last February.8 The tests
which a plan must meet if it is to have any chance of favorable
consideration appear to include the following:
I. There must be no interference with the power of the
Supreme Court to control its own docket.
2. There must not be, for cases generally, four tiers of courts,
and the appellate process must not be unduly prolonged.
3. There should not be a specialized tribunal.
4. There should not be discrimination, either in fact or in
appearance, against classes of litigation,
5. The federal judiciary should not be unduly expanded.
6. The method of selecting the judges for any new tribunal
should not be subject to dominance by any administration
or political party.
7. Any new court should be one on which able judges are
willing to sit.
II
THE BURDEN ON THE COURT

Much of the consideration of the problem has focused on the
size of the Supreme Court's caseload. This was the main foundation of the Freund Report; and it did show quite clearly, as was, of
course, well known, that the number of cases taken to the Court
had greatly increased in recent years. Without going back to earlier
years, the Freund Report showed that the number of cases filed in
the Court was 1,234 in 1951, and had nearly tripled to 3,643 in the
1971 Term. 9 We can now add that these figures have continued to
increase over the two most recent Terms. New filings were 3,741 in
the 1972 Term, and 4,186 in the 1973 Term just completed.10
8 Hufstedler, supra note 7, at 547-48.
9 FREUND REPORT 2.
10 See 43 U.S.L.W. 3085 (1974). It should be noted that the figure for the 1973 Term is

subject to qualification, since that Term did not end until July 25, 1974. This will distort the
figures somewhat, adding perhaps 300 filings in the 1973 Term (and making a corresponding reduction for the 1974 Term). The rate of increase may have slowed down somewhat,
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Consideration of the work load of the Justices is consistent
with historical precedent." Modem discussion of the problem can
perhaps be said to begin with Professor Henry M. Hart's article in
1959,12 when he showed how little time the Justices could possibly
spend in consideration of many of the cases before them. And that
related to the 1-958 Term, when there were 1,819 cases filed, or less
than half of the number at the present time
But the difficulty with this approach is that some of the
Justices deny that they are overburdened. Justice Douglas immediately responded to Professor Hart, with a lecture here at the
Cornell Law School, where he strongly asserted that there was no
overburden on the Court. 13 More recently, speaking from the
bench, Justice Douglas has said that "[t]he case for our 'overwork'
is a myth.' 4 Justice Brennan has denied the suggestion of overwork in more guarded terms, but with considerable feeling. 1 The
last published word by Chief Justice Warren was likewise an
affirmation of the Supreme Court's capacity to meet its
responsibilities. 1 6 On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger, 1 7 'and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist 1 8 have indicated that they feel there
is a problem. 19 I have no doubt in my own mind-having watched
the matter rather closely from the outside-that there is a problem,
and a very serious one. But I have slowly come to the conclusion
that we have been looking at the wrong problem. As long as
influential members of the Court say that they are not overworked,
and as long as many people feel that the effort to bring about
but the fact remains that the Supreme Court has at least three times as many cases filed each
year today as it did in 1951. From any point of view, that is a serious matter which requires
careful attention.
" In 1887 and 1888, Attorney General Garland made a plea "that something be done"
to relieve the Supreme Court of that day. ChiefJustice Waite, and Justices Harlan and Field
"sought to enlist public opinion to secure Congressional action." See F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SuPREuE COURT 96-97 (1928). This crisis was resolved by the

adoption of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act in 1891. See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26
Stat. 826.
12 Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959).

13 Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1960).
14 Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
He went on to refer to "the vast leisure time we presently have" (409 U.S at 177), and
concluded that "[w]e are vastly underworked." 409 U.S. at 178. For any qne other than
Justice Douglas, this would seem to be hyperbole.
15 Brennan, supra note 7.
16 Warren, supra note 7.
1 See Address by Chief Justice Burger, Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute, May 16, 1973 (41 U.S.L.W. 2627 (1973)).
18 Rehnquist, supra note 7.
19 See generally Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 541 (1958).
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revisions in the Court's jurisdiction is in some way an attack on the
Court, it is hard to develop a satisfactory cure for an illness the
existence of which is vigorously denied.
It is the purpose of this lecture to suggest that we have been
looking at the wrong illness. As I have said, I think there is
overwork, with serious consequences. But that is not all of the
problem, and if we cannot make progress in terms of overwork, we
should look further and see what else is worthy of consideration.
In short, we have focused so closely and intensely on the question
of overwork that we have almost entirely failed to see that the real
problem is inadequate final appellate capacity in this country.
III
OUR PRESENT SYSTEM SEVERELY RATIONS JUSTICE

To the extent that the Court is in fact not overworked, it is
only because we have been rationing justice at the Supreme Court
level. We began to do that when the concept of certiorari was
introduced in 1891.20 Discretionary review by the Supreme Court
was extended considerably in 1925.21 But it was still realistic. At
that time there were less than a thousand cases on the Court's
docket. Now there are over four thousand. That figure alone really
tells the story. And many more cases would be brought to the
Supreme Court if there were any prospect that the Court could
review them.
Accepting the assertion of some members of the Court that
they are not overworked-which, as a practical matter we must
-we should recognize that this situation exists because, under the
certiorari statute, and the practices of the Court, the Court controls its own docket, as far as cases heard on the merits are
concerned. The Court was hearing about 150 cases on the merits in
1925; it was hearing about 150 cases on the merits twenty-five years
ago. 222 It hears about 150 cases on the merits today. 23 It is cases on
the merits, say members of the Court, which take up most of their
time. For various reasons, the consideration of applications for
20

See note 4 and accompanying text, supra.

21 See note 5 and accompanying text, supra.
22 FREUND REPORT, Tab. IV, at A7.
23 The statistics published by the Clerk show that 177 "cases" were argued at the 1973
Term. 43 U.S.L.W. 3085 (1974). But often two or three or four or more cases are heard at a
single argument, and amount in terms of "caseload" to a single argument. These are
questions of judgment and degree, but I tbink that a total of about I50 "cases heard" is
reasonably accurate.
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review-petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements on
appeals-is not a very time-consuming task. So the Court is not
overworked, because it controls its own docket.
But what is the cost? I suggest that the cost is substantial. It is
not much recognized by the Court, because they are busy with
what they are doing, and understandably they have no time for
cases they cannot review. It is not recognized very clearly by
outsiders, because the individual instances of non-review are just
that-they are individual instances; and they do not get into the
reports. So it is hard to see just what is going on. I would like to
suggest in this lecture that there is a default in the system, and that
the time has surely come to do something about it. I will also make
some observations about what I think can be done.
A. Discretionary Cutting of the Court's Docket Has
Become Extreme
The inevitable effect of the system under which the Court
operates is that it has had to ration justice. Or, to put it another
way, it is only by rationing justice that the Court has kept from
being overworked. That this is so can be shown in several ways.
The number of cases filed with the Court has approximately
tripled since 1951.24 It is not an answer to say that the great
increase has come in informa pauperis cases, for the increase in paid
cases has been nearly proportional. 25 The number of cases argued
orally in 1951 was 128.26 The number of cases argued orally at the
1973 Term was 170.27 But there were a considerable number of
occasions when two or more cases were heard at a single argument.
Thus, there were approximately 150 oral arguments, and this
number has been more or less constant for a number of years. It is,
in fact, the maximum number that the Court can be expected to
hear on the merits.
What has been happening is that as the number of cases filed
has steadily increased, the Court has been forced to make its cut at
a higher and higher point on the overall list. 28 This means inevita24 The total number of cases filed in 1951 was 1,234. FREUND REPORT, Tab. II, at A2.
The total number of cases filed in the J1973 Term was 4,186. 43 U.S.L.W. 3085 (1974).
23 The number of paid cases filed in 1951 was 717. FREUND REPORT, Tab. II, at A2. The
number of paid cases filed in the 1973 Term was 2,068. 43 U.S.L.W. 3085 (1974).
26 FREUND REPORT, Tab. IV, at A7.
27 43 U.S.L.W. 3085 (1974).
28 One is reminded of the situation which has arisen with respect to admission to law
schools. When a school has 7,000 applications with only 550 places available, it is forced to
decline applications from large numbers of persons who are well qualified, and whom the
school would very much like to have as students. But the school has no choice where its
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bly that cases which would have been regarded as worthy of review
fifty or twenty years ago cannot be heard today. In other words,
they must be rationed out. Indeed, it is even worse than the figures
alone indicate. With paid cases, at least, there can be no doubt that
the overall mixture has been enriched, for many cases which would
have been filed in the Supreme Court twenty years ago are not
filed now simply because counsel know how unlikely it is that
certiorari will be granted in any except certain types of cases, and it
is many times concluded that the considerable expense of filing is
not justified.29
Putting it another way, about eighteen percent of paid cases
(appeals and certiorari) were heard on the merits twenty years ago,
while about six percent of paid cases were heard on the merits
during the 1973 Term. 30 What became of the other twelve percent
of the paid cases? They were of a quality or caliber which would
have entitled them to review only twenty years ago. But they were
lost in the 1973 Term simply because of inadequate appellate
capacity to hear cases on a national basis.
B. Lack of Precedents Impairs the Functioning of an
Effective Appellate System

It is a rather astonishing fact that less than one percent of the
cases decided by our courts of appeals are reviewed on the merits
by the Supreme Court. 31 Of course I think the courts of appeals
are very competent and hard-working courts, and many of their
judges are among the most distinguished in the nation. Aid I
would agree that a litigant does not have a right to a second appeal.
Nevertheless, I do not think that this is a good way to run a legal
system.
The courts of appeals know that the chance that any decision
they write will be reviewed is very slight, and this has led, I think,
to a considerable lack of what I would call institutional responsibilintake is fixed, with selection to some extent inevitably on an arbitrary basis. Some schools
try to deal with this by such procedures as those involved in DeFunis v. Ordegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974). Can there be any doubt that similar considerations enter into Supreme Court
grants of certiorari--that is, that there is an appreciable amount of "affirmative action" in
certiorari consideration?
29 There is the cost of counsel, the cost of printing a petition, and a filing fee of $100
for a "paid" case on the appellate docket. It would be a rare case where these would
aggregate less than $1,000.
30 Of petitions filed, 10.6% were granted. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 43, 277 (1974). But these indude a considerable number of cases which were
summarily disposed of without brief, oral argument, or opinion in the Supreme Court.
31 Hufstedler, supra note 7, at 546-47.
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ity on the part of many court of appeals judges. The district judges
keep reasonably well in line because they know that the courts of
appeals are reviewing their work. And the courts of appeals can be
expected t o follow a decision of the Supreme Court which is
directly in point. But with so few cases being reviewed by the
Supreme Court, there are, in many fields, few decisions directly in
point. The tendency to press beyond what the Supreme Court has
done has often been irresistible.3 2 And there is no stability in the
make-up of the courts of appeals. Some of them now have fifteen
judges, together with a number of senior judges. What judge will
be on a panel is a pure matter of chance. Besides, there are now a
large number of roving judges-district judges and judges from
other circuits-so that the bench one gets in a court of appeals is a
kind of lottery. Some of the panels pay little attention to the
decisions of other panels; and some of the courts seem to have little
or no concern for inconsistencies in the decisions of different
panels. 33 This results in increased litigation all along the line, for if
the law of the circuit is uncertain, counsel cannot conscientiously
recommend to his client that he should not litigate. And where less
than one percent of the decisions of the courts of appeals are
reviewed by the Supreme Court, it is hard to say that there is any
national law on many subjects. Moreover, conscientious counsel
often cannot recommend against litigation, even if there is a
decision in his circuit, for who knows what may happen? The
lightning of review may strike in some case from another circuit.
Even though few circuit cases are reviewed, the chance that one
may be makes it impossible to rely on any circuit court decision.
If ten percent of the court of appeals cases were reviewed by a
court with national authority, the law would soon be clarified and
stabilized, and the amount of litigation could be markedly reduced.
Americans who have long lived with their system, which was
adequate in the past, do not readily realize how chaotic it has
become under current conditions of sharply rationed review by the
Supreme Court.
There are other ways in which the situation may be tested. As
See Note, Lower CourtDisavowal of Supreme CourtPrecedent, 60 VA. L. REv. 494 (1974).
Cf. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973). See also Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
33 The logistical problem in holding hearings en banc in a court made up of 15 judges
based in widely scattered cities is obviously very great. Yet the Fifth Circuit regularly holds a
number of such hearings, and is obviously concerned with harmony in the law of the circuit.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit recently went for more than two years without holding
a single hearing en banc. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), illustrates the
32

consequences.
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I read the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Term just ended,
there were 146 decisions by full opinion of the Court.34 Of these
more than ninety, or close to two-thirds, were decisions of constitutional questions-due process, equal protection, various questions
under the first amendment, ranging from obscenity, through flags
worn on pants, oaths, and the right to require a newspaper to
publish a reply, questions of jury trial, prison rules, segregation,
search and seizure, self-incrimination, confrontation, ballot access,
and the eleventh amendment. Most of the other cases were standard federal specialties-federal criminal law, federal taxation,
National Labor Relations Board, bankruptcy, federal arbitration
act, Indians, civil service, and admiralty, among others. There was
one government contract case, one case involving the use of inside
information, one case involving trade secrets (though the issue
there was whether there was a federal pre-emption through the
patent laws), and one case involving equity procedure.
As I have observed before,3 5 I do not think that the public or
the bar is fully aware of the extent to which the Supreme Court of
the United States has become a civil rights court. This is fine. It is a
terribly important function for our highest court, and this is
particularly true in a country which has the constitutionally expressed ideals that we have. I do not denigrate this part of the
Court's work one bit. But I do suggest that it is not the whole of the
function which should be performed on a national basis in a highly
industrialized country of over 210 million people. If all our Court
can do is to handle the most important civil rights cases, and a few
others, then we are rationing justice and should be prepared to do
something about it.
C. Too Few Government Cases Can Be Reviewed

There is another point of view from which I have seen the
problem. For six Terms, from 1967 until June 1973, I served as
Solicitor General of the United States, where it was a part of my
responsibility to pass upon nearly every case where any officer or
agency of the government had lost a case in a lower court and
34 This does not include the cases disposed of by summary affirmance or reversal,
without hearing, of which there were a considerable number. Indeed, the fact that so many
cases are decided on the merits, but without hearing by the Court, is another illustration of
how justice is now rationed because of the pressures on the Court.
The Harvard Law Review statistics show 157 written opinions, of which 17 were "per
curiam opinions containing substantial legal reasoning." The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARv. L. REv. 43, 277 (1974). Many of the per curiam cases are decided without briefs on

the merits or oral argument.
35 Griswold, supra note 7, at 618.
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wanted to take the case to the Supreme Court, either by appeal or
by certiorari. In effect, the Solicitor General does most of the
screening which is done in other cases by the Supreme Court, 36 for
he tries to take to the Court only cases which, based upon his close
observation of the work of the Court, he thinks that the Court will
accept. On this basis, the Solicitor General usually files about
thirty-five petitions every year, most of which are in fact granted.
But in the process he has two serious problems: (1) there are a fair
number of cases which he thinks are really worthy of final appellate review, but where he does not file because he knows that the
pressures on the Court now are such that it probably will not be
able to take the cases; and (2) in the process, the Solicitor General
incurs the dislike, sometimes rather intense, of a good many other
government lawyers, both within and outside the Department of
Justice. Indeed, one of the last things I did in my service as
Solicitor General was to appear before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce in an effort to head off a bill
which would provide that the so-called independent agencies could
have direct access to the Supreme Court, without having to seek
the approval of the Solicitor General.3 7 I think that would be bad
policy for the government under present circumstances. But I
would also say, from close personal experience, that there are at
least twenty government cases every year which are fully worthy of
review by an appellate court with national jurisdiction and that the
government and the legal system suffer from the rationing we now
impose, and from the lack of authoritative decisions which would
come from such review and would serve as a guide to government
agencies and the lower courts.
D.

"Appeal by Right" Has Virtually Disappeared

Another way in which justice has been rationed under current
conditions is found in the virtual disappearance of the distinction
between certiorari and appeal. Congress has dearly provided that
there shall be a class of cases in which there is appeal as of right.3 8
36 And this affects the Court's statistics.
7 Hearingson H.R. 550 and H.R. 340 (SecuritiesExchange Act Amendments of 1973) Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-50, pt. 1, at 272-96 (statement of Erwin N. Griswold, Solicitor
General of the United States).
38 Appeals from state courts are provided for by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(1), (2) (1970).
Similarly, appeals from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico are provided for by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1258(1), (2) (1970). Appeals from courts of appeals are provided for by 28 U.S.C. §
1254(2) (1970). There are other provisions authorizing appeals, including 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1970), where a federal court has held an act of Congress unconstitutional; 28 U.S.C. § 1253
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In other classes of cases, Congress has provided for discretionary
review by certiorari. This was, for example, the situation in 1925,
when "over 80 percent of the matters argued in open court, or
about 250 cases a year" came to the Court on writ of error, now
known as appeal. 39 At that time, "[t]he remaining 20 percent of the
argued matters consisted of about 60 to 70 cases in which petitions
for certiorari had been granted, out of about 500 such petitions
40
annually directed to this discretionary jurisdiction of the Court.
It will be noted that in 1925 the Court heard many cases on appeal,
and also granted from twelve to fourteen percent of the relatively
small number of petitions for certiorari before it.
Now, all this has changed. With few exceptions, appeals are
treated as discretionary, and are routinely dismissed "for want of a
substantial federal question." When this phrase was developed, it
had a real meaning. It expressed a judgment by the Court that the
question sought to be raised by the appeal was not arguable,
because it had already been disposed of by decisions of the Court.
In the time of Chief Justice Hughes, such orders also included
either a line or two of reasons, 4 1 or the citations of cases which
showed the basis for the Court's conclusion that the issue was not
42
arguable.
Very slowly, over a period of many years, the Court's approach to appeals has completely changed, due, of course, to the
pressure brought to bear on the Court by the great number of
cases filed. In most cases, there is no longer any practical distinction between appeal and certiorari, despite the fact that Congress,
which has power to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
has given the Court no discretion with respect to appeals. 4 3 Ap(1970), providing for appeals from three-judge courts; 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), providing
for appeals by the United States in criminal cases; and 49 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), providing for
appeals from district court decisions in antitrust cases.
39 See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 147 (4th ed. 1969).
40 Id. The Stern and Gressman figures are drawn from Frankfurter & Landis, The
Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 HAmv. L. R~v. 1, 10, 13 (1928). See also
Burton, Judging Is Also Administration, 33 A.B.A.J. 1099, 1102 (1947).
41 See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 289 U.S. 701 (1933).
42 See, e.g., Antonoplos v. John Eichleay, Jr., Co., 289 U.S. 703 (1933); Miller v. State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 287 U.S. 563 (1932).
43 In Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972), the court of appeals
said: "A summary affirmance without opinion in a case within the Supreme Court's
obligatory appellate jurisdiction has very little precedential significance." In National Liberty
Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 62 Wis. 2d 347, 364, 215 N.W.2d 26, 35 (1974), the court said
that a dismissal of an appeal by the Supreme Court "is considered a decision on the merits
although in practical terms it may be of no greater precedential value than a denial of
certiorari."
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peals are now subject to "the rule of four," the same as petitions for
certiorari-that is, at least four Justices must vote to take the case
before it will be heard. Many appeals are disposed of on the merits
summarily, without briefing or oral argument. Even the statistics
prepared by the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court no
longer draw a distinction between cases brought to the Court by
appeal or by certiorari. All cases on the docket are listed simply as
"Cases granted review," or as "Cases denied, dismissed, or
withdrawn. '44 There is also a category of "Cases summarily dis45
missed" of which there were 147 during the term just closed.
This amounts to a further rationing of justice. Even where
Congress has provided that there shall be an appeal as of right
(which was the basis of the problem in 1925), the Court has taken it
upon itself to rewrite the statute and to treat most appeals as the
equivalent of petitions for certiorari, subject only to discretionary
review. As indicated, the reasons for this are obvious, and are
important. The Court would be in an impossible situation if it
accepted full compulsory review in all cases where appeal is provided by statute. The Court has acted in self-defense, even though
it has essentially ignored the statutory provisions in doing so. One
can have great sympathy for the Court. Yet, it is clear that this is
another, and important, way in which the Court has rationed
justice as part of the process of keeping itself from being overworked.
IV
THE CASES WHICH ARE NOT REVIEWED

What is the consequence of this rationing? What cases are not
heard that should have been heard? That is a very difficult question to answer, for no one is in a position to make the judgment, on
a discretionary basis, that has been allocated to, or undertaken by,
the Supreme Court of the United States. Even if one were to
undertake the task, it would be an enormous enterprise, involving
the review of the papers in all of the 3,514 cases in which the Court
did not grant review at the 1973 Term. It may well be that many of
these would be easily disposed of as unworthy of review on any
basis, but others would present great difficulties. And of course no
one would agree on the exact cases in which review would have
44 See 43 U.S.L.W.
45 Id.

3085 (1974).
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been granted if the Court could hear on the merits twice as many
cases as it hears now.
An enterprise of this sort was undertaken by Professor Fowler
Harper and associates more than twenty years ago.4 6 Even though

the Court then had less than a third as many cases on its docket as
it has now, Professor Harper found much to criticize: many cases
in which review was denied though it would seem that the case met
the Court's stated tests for the granting of certiorari. If that was the
case then, it would seem clear that the situation cannot be any
better now when three times as many cases are taken to the
Supreme Court, including three times as many cases on the "paid"
or appellate docket. The loss is not merely in the arbitrary or
haphazard nature of the justice which results, including almost
complete denial of appellate review in various aspects of the law,
but it is also a very important institutional loss through the lack of a
substantial number of authoritative appellate decisions for the
guidance and control of the lower courts, thus leaving the courts of
appeals, in particular, rather at large in many fields.
I have not undertaken such a case-by-case review of the
petitions and jurisdictional statements where the Court did not
grant review. First, I have not had available either the facilities 47 or
the time. 48 Second, even if the task were accomplished, the results
would be highly criticized on one ground or another, so that the
effort would probably be ineffective, as Professor Harper's work
was. Finally, such a laborious sifting of many cases is not necessary,
because it is obvious that if the Court could hear on the merits
twice as many cases as it now does, the cases are there for selection.
The result would be a diminution of the present system of rationing of justice between parties, and an increase in the number of
nationally binding appellate decisions for the guidance and control
of the lower courts and of counsel in their basically important work
of advising clients. Counsel are so accustomed to the fact that "no
one knows the answer" in many areas that they accept it as
inevitable, and are hardened to it. There can only be acceptance
when no one sees a way out. But it is a fact, I believe, that our
46 Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An
Appraisal of Certiorari,99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950); Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme
Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1951); Harper & ?ratt, What
the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1953).
47 Undertaking this task could be done only with ready access to all of the papers, and
this could be done only in the Clerk's office.
48 1 would estimate the amount of time involved to be at least 400 hours of rather
dreary work. Even that would allow an average of only seven minutes per case.
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appellate system is not working well, and one of the basic causes is
that appellate review by the Supreme Court has become so sharply
rationed. One recent study has moved in the direction I have in mind.4 9
This is the article by Professors Gerhard Casper and Richard A.
Posner entitled A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload. The authors
have conducted a detailed review, based on digest paragraphs in
the United States Law Week, of all the "paid" cases filed in the
Supreme Court at the 1971 and 1972 Terms, ending in June 1973.
This shows, as would be expected, a sharp change in the kinds of
cases in which the Court's review is sought. They use the 1957 and
1958 Terms as a base for comparison. They show that there are
many areas in which there has not been an increase in the cases
filed. These include taxation, Power Commission, Trade Commission and Interstate Commerce Commission, immigration, Department of Justice antitrust, eminent domain, tort claims, diversity
cases, and civil actions from state courts, among others. Filings in
this overall group have decreased from a total of 746, for the 1957
and 1958 Terms combined, to a total of 629 for the 1971 and 1972
Terms combined. 50 But then there is another group of cases, all
civil cases on the appellate or "paid" docket, where the aggregate
filings increased from 198 at the 1957 and 1958 Terms combined,
to 880 at the 1971 and 1972 Terms combined. 5 1 The cases in this
group include military, National Labor -Relations Board, Civil
Rights Acts (which increased from 8 to 111), education (which
increased from 0 to 40), reapportionment (which increased from 0
to 29), elections (which increased from 2 to 63), private antitrust,
private SEC, and government personnel.
These data support what 1 have said about a great shift in the
nature of the cases now coming before the Supreme Court, and the
extent to which the Court has become not only a constitutional law
court but also a civil rights tribunal. Though they shed much light
on the nature of the cases which come to the Court (affected in
very large measure, I suspect, by the small prospect that anything
other than a civil rights case will obtain review), they give no light
at all on the nature of the cases which are accepted for review, and
particularly, on the number and kinds of cases which are not
accepted for review. I do not criticize Professors Casper and
49 Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3
(1974).
50 Id. at 356.
51 Id. at 357.
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Posner for this, for the task is a forbidding one; and I note with
pleasure at the close of their article that their research is continuing, and that they feel there is a possibility that they may be able to
develop some materials along the lines I have suggested. 52 In the
meantime, the work they have done is important, and is, I think,
entirely consistent with the thesis that I am advancing here, namely
that-because we have not been able to avoid it-justice is too
much rationed in this country at the highest appellate level. To put
the same point another way: we are, I think, suffering materially,
both in terms of individual justice and in terms of the institutional
effectiveness of an appellate system, from a serious lack of nationally binding appellate capacity in this country.
V
A

PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES

If this view is sound, or even if it is worthy of serious consideration, what can be done about it? It is little use to play Cassandra.
If there is a problem, is there any solution which has enough merit
to make it worthy of consideration?
Many good people have worked hard and long on this question, starting with the Freund study group, which proposed what
came to be called a "mini court," -ith-isponsibility to screen the
cases which are heard by the Court on the merits, thus relieving
the Court from the arduous task of reviewing thousands of applications for review. 5 3 This would preserve its time and energy for
the presumably more important tasks of judging on the merits, and
opinion writing.
When the Freund proposal was attacked, others advanced the
suggestion of a nationwide division of the United States Court of
Appeals, with its jurisdiction conferred by the Supreme Court by
rule within boundaries set by Congress.5 4 Further thought has led
me to the conclusion that this proposal, and my variation of it, 55
have serious defects or problems. Two of these in particular may
52

Id. at 374-75.

53 FREUND REPORT 18-24.

54 A proposal along these lines was made by the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice,
and was approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. See
Hufstedler, supra note 7. 1 espoused such a proposal, with some variations, in the David C.
Baum Memorial Lecture at the University of Illinois Law School. See Griswold, supra note 7,
at 628-32.
5 See Griswold, supra note 7, at 628-32.
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be mentioned: First, it is very hard to formulate the precise
categories of cases which will be heard by the National Panel, and
to develop a method for selection. Second, the selection of judges
for the National Panel is a matter of great difficulty. Various
suggestions were made for the allocation of judges of the courts of
appeals for terms, 5 6 but it was not clear that all judges would
welcome such assignments. And many of us felt that a bench made
up of rotating judges would lack the permanence and stability
which it was highly desirable to have on such a court. The objective
is not merely to decide cases, but to provide precedents which will
be a reliable guide for lower courts and for counsel.
The question of judicial selection was made especially difficult
at the time because of a generally prevailing hesitation under then
existing circumstances to have this done with Presidential participation. Now times have changed, and this aspect of the difficulty may
have eased, though all would agree that selection of such a court
should not be dominated or controlled by a single administration
or party.
Is there a better plan? I think there is, and I will try to outline
it briefly here.
I propose the establishment of a new tribunal, to be known as
the National Court of the United States. It will have status above
the courts of appeals, which will remain regional courts as they are
now, and below the Supreme Court of the United States, which will
remain the one Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
All petitions for certiorari and all appeals will be filed in the
Supreme Court of the United States, just as they are now, and all
will be considered and passed upon by the Supreme Court, just as
they are now. The Supreme Court, and only the Supreme Court,
will decide which cases will be heard on the merits. We are told that
this task is not unduly time-consuming, and it would seem that it
can be continued, with the Supreme Court working out the way in
which it will be handled, as it does now.
Now we come to the first change that I propose. This is that the
Supreme Court will grant review in about twice as many cases as it
does now, and will at the same time assign half of the cases granted
to the National Court of the United States for decision. Presumably
this would be about 150 to 160 cases; and the Supreme Court
would retain a similar number for its own decision. This would
double the national appellate capacity of the United States, without
increasing the burden on the Supreme Court. Presumably, the
56 Cf. Hufstedler, supra note 7, at 548.
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most important cases would be retained by the Supreme Court for
decision by it on the merits, and the next tier of cases, still
important, though of lesser importance, would be assigned to the
National Court. The cases going to the National Court would all be
cases which do not receive review now.
This plan has the merit that it does not interfere in any way
with the Supreme Court. That Court would still decide everything
that it does now. It also has the merit that it makes it unnecessary
to try to frame jurisdictional lines as to what cases would be heard
by one court and what cases by the other. The allocation would be
made by the Supreme Court in its discretion-just as it now denies
review entirely in this second tier of cases, again in its discretion.
The cases which would go to the National Court of the United
States would presumably include most tax cases, many patent and
antitrust cases, some diversity cases, NLRB cases, and some Power
Commission and Trade Commission cases, among others. Most
constitutional cases would continue to be heard directly by the
Supreme Court, but some of these, particularly cases involving an
application of already established constitutional principles, would
be assigned to the National Court. However, this need not be
spelled out, for it would be done by the Supreme Court in its
discretion. The guiding principle would simply be: The 150 most
important cases, more or less, will stay with the Supreme Court for
decision on the merits, and the next most important 150 cases,
57
more or less, will be allocated to the National Court.
The decisions of the National Court will be subject to review
by the Supreme Court. But it can be expected that very few of
them will be so reviewed. The decisions of the National Court will
be nationally binding, so there will be no question of conflict of
decision. In the tax field, for example, they will give the certainty
which is now so often lacking. The cases will, by hypothesis, be of
secondary importance, so they would rarely merit being reviewed
in the first tier of Supreme Court business.
Review of the decisions of the National Court by the Supreme
Court could be by certiorari, in which case there would be, to that
extent, a fourth tier of review. But this could be done by filing in
the Supreme Court the briefs used in the National Court, together
with the National Court's opinion, on a shortened time schedule. It
17 I would eliminate the formal distinction between appeal and certiorari in most cases.
But the situation should be regularized. We should not continue to have a system where
there are many appeals "as of right," but where administration is, for the most part, on a
discretionary basis. See note 38 supra.
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is very likely that only a fraction of the cases decided by the
National Court would be brought before the Supreme Court. Or
review by the Supreme Court could be simply by having a rule that
all opinions of the National Court are filed with the Supreme
Court-the Supreme Court could call for further argument on
review if it wished-and decisions of the National Court would
become final after a stated period unless the Supreme Court had
entered an order granting review, or extending the time within
which it might consider granting review (for use over the summer
recess, for example).
If a National Court is established, it might have five or seven
judges. I think I would prefer seven, so that it could handle about
as many cases on,, the merits as the Supreme Court now does,
without having to consider applications for review which would
remain the task of the Supreme Court. I think, too, that the judges
should be ,nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, holding tenure on the same basis as the Justices of the
Supreme Court. (They might be known as judges rather than as
justices, to distinguish them from the Supreme Court.) I do not
like the idea of rotating judges. We have too many roving judges
today as it is. It should be a great distinction to be a judge of the
National Court, and many judges of the present courts of appeals
should be eligible for consideration. But the judges, when appointed, should be appointed to the bench of the National Court
and nowhere else. They should not sit elsewhere, except possibly
after retirement. The National panel should have a continuity and
stability like that of the Supreme Court. Of course it will change
from time to time, but those changes should be rare and developments should be slow, just as they are now in the Supreme Court.
There is a problem, of course, in having one President name
the entire original bench. But the most difficult aspect of that
problem is eliminated by recent changes in the presidency. And the
requirement of confirmation by the Senate should, under present
circumstances, assure nominees, or at least confirmees, of high
quality, and divergent background and view. If some of the original appointments were of relatively senior judges already on the
bench of the courts of appeals, vacancies would be occurring from
time to time. To that extent, the continuity and stability which I
regard as important might be lost; but this might be more than
compensated for by the caliber of such appointments; and the
problem would be a transient one anyway.
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This plan meets, I think, all of the considerations or requirements which were stated earlier in this lecture:
1. It would not interfere with the power of the Supreme
Court to control its own docket. 58

2. There would not be, for cases generally, four tiers of courts
(although a relatively small number might be involved in
four tiers), and it would not prolong the appellate process
at all for most cases (those in which review was denied, and
those which were heard on the merits by the Supreme
Court itself). The additional time required .would be slight
in the small number of cases decided by the National Court
which might be heard thereafter by the Supreme Court.
3. There would not be a specialized tribunal.59
4. There would not be discrimination, either in fact or in
appearance, against classes of litigation. All discriminations
would be made by the Supreme Court, and would be fewer
than now exist, since, under the plan, a considerable
number of cases would be heard on the merits which are
now denied national appellate review entirely.
5. The federal judiciary would not be unduly expanded.
6. The method of selecting the judges would not be unduly
subject to domination if the Senate carefully performs its
constitutional duty of advice and consent.
7. The court would be one on which able judges are willing to
sit.
ENVOI

Many words and much thought have been expended on this
subject. One is perhaps unduly bold to offer further discussion.
But the problem continues and is important. The fact is, I think,
that we have been unduly rationing appellate justice in this country, and it is an obligation of the bar to help the Congress to find a
5s Thus the concern expressed by Chief justice Warren in Let's Not Weaken the Supreme
Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 677 (1974), and by others, would be met.
59 A good many years ago 1 wrote an article proposing that there should be a special
court to hear appeals in tax cases. Griswold, The Needfor a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L.
REv. 1153 (1944). The suggestion met strong opposition because, among other things, it
would establish a specialized tribunal in tax cases. The present proposal would appear to
meet all the objectives of my plan of 30 years ago, but the tribunal suggested would not in
any sense be a specialized court. It would be available to decide many tax cases which are not
now decided by a national appellate court, but it would also decide cases in many other
fields, indeed, in any field, as the cases were assigned to it by the Supreme Court.
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better way. My effort has been to shift the discussion from the
burden on the Supreme Court-which I believe is real, but which
has proven to be controversial-and to try to focus attention on
what I now think is the heart of the problem, namely the fact that
we lack adequate appellate capacity in this country on a national
level, and that, as a consequence, we have been unduly rationing
justice.
On this problem, it is not what the Supreme Court does which
is important, but what it cannot do. There is, I think, a ready way
to double the national appellate capacity of the country, without in
any way impairing the work or function of the Supreme Court.
The plan I suggest is simple, understandable, draftable, and capable of administration, without jurisdictional lines, or other elements
which would engender purely procedural litigation. I hope that my
effort to focus on the problem of our present highly restricted
appellate capacity is consistent with Judge Hand's admonition, and
that it is worthy of consideration.

